Chemical tanker Ovit runs aground in the Dover Strait

Safety issues directly contributing to the accident that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations

1. The passage plan, which was prepared by an inexperienced and unsupervised junior officer, passed directly over the Varne Bank and was unsafe.
2. The passage plan was not properly checked for navigational hazards using the ECDIS check-route function and it was not checked by the master.
3. When taking over the watch, the OOW did not check the ship’s intended track relative to any dangers to navigation that would be encountered on his watch.
4. The OOW monitored the vessel’s position solely against the intended track. Consequently, his situational awareness was poor.
5. Although the lights from the cardinal buoys marking the Varne Bank were seen by the lookout, they were not reported.
6. The passage through the Dover Strait was treated in exactly the same way as a passage in open water. Moreover, the master demonstrated an astounding level of complacency when his vessel was apparently drifting in the Dover Strait without propulsion.
7. The deck officers were unable to safely navigate using the vessel’s ECDIS. The route was not properly checked, inappropriate depth and cross track error settings were used, and the scale of ENC in use was unsuitable for the area.
8. The ECDIS audible alarm was inoperative. Although the crew were aware of this defect, it had not been reported.
9. ECDIS training undertaken by the ship’s master and deck officers had not equipped them with the level of knowledge necessary to operate the system effectively.
10. The SMS bridge procedures provided on board Ovit by Ayder Tankers Ltd were comprehensive and included extensive guidance on the conduct of navigation using ECDIS. However, it is evident that the master and deck officers did not implement the ship manager’s policies for safe navigation and bridge watchkeeping.
11. The on board management of Ovit was dysfunctional and the master providedinsufficient leadership for a safety culture to be developed and instilled on his bridge.
12. The serious shortcomings with the navigation on board Ovit highlighted in this investigation had not been identified during the vessel’s recent audits andinspections. There is a strong case to develop and provide tools for auditors and inspectors to check the use and performance of ECDIS.
13. The Varne Bank alerting system operated by Dover Coastguard did not work as intended. A VHF warning was not broadcast to Ovit because the CNIS operator was distracted. Also, the operator was not qualified for the role and was not supervised. In addition, there was no specific training in the alerting system, and the alerting procedure had not been formalised.
14. It was inappropriate for the two fully qualified members of the Dover Coastguard watch to be absent from the operations room at the same time, leaving theunqualified operator unsupervised.
15. It is of concern that chronic manpower shortages within Dover Coastguard resulted in watches constantly being under-manned and/or augmented by members of other watches.

Safety issues not directly contributing to the accident that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations

1. Several of the features of the Maris 900 ECDIS on board Ovit were either difficult to use or appeared not to comply with international standards.
2. As ECDIS is increasingly widely fitted in accordance with mandatory IMO carriage requirements, there would potentially be significant benefit from a testing regime similar to that required for VDRs.

Other safety issues not directly contributing to the accident

1. It took the OOW 19 minutes to realise that Ovit was aground and a further 14 minutes to report the accident to Dover Coastguard. The OOW’s vagueness when subsequently answering the coastguard’s questions was unhelpful and potentially could have delayed assistance.