The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a nonpartisan international affairs think tank headquartered in Washington, D.C., looks at the effects of the price cap on the composition of the tanker fleet serving the Russian oil trade.
According to Carnagie Endowment, in 2024, the data reveals that 735 oil tankers out of a global fleet of 2,849 picked up at least one load from Russian ports, transporting an average of 48 million barrels of oil per day. This number represents about a quarter of the global oil tanker fleet, indicating that a significant portion of the world’s oil shipping industry remains intertwined with Russian crude exports.
The term “shadow fleet” suggests a clandestine network, but the reality is that this fleet is not as exclusive as it may appear. These vessels often pick up cargoes from both Russian and non-Russian ports, revealing a substantial overlap with the broader global fleet.
A notable feature of Russia’s oil transport strategy is its reliance on older vessels. The median age of tankers involved in transporting Russian oil is around 16 years, which is slightly older than the global average of 13 years. While older vessels are often perceived as less safe and more prone to accidents, the statistics do not support this assumption.
The global tanker fleet, including older ships, has maintained a strong safety record. According to ITOPF, the number of significant oil spills has been minimal over the last 15 years, with just three major spills and 55 large spills (over 5,000 barrels) since 2000. Notably, the most recent major spills involved relatively young vessels, underscoring that age alone is not a reliable predictor of risk.
The use of older ships in Russia’s oil trade may be a deliberate strategy. These vessels are less valuable and easier to scrap if they become entangled in sanctions enforcement or other regulatory issues. This approach minimizes financial risks for shipowners, who might otherwise face penalties from entities like the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Consequently, Russia’s fleet composition is older than that of other major oil-exporting nations, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, whose fleets tend to be younger and comprised of newer tankers. However, even in these countries, there is a significant portion of the fleet that is older, indicating that Russia’s tanker age gap is not particularly drastic.
One comparison shows that Iran, another sanctions-hit country, exclusively uses older vessels in its oil trade. Iran’s tankers are predominantly more than 10 years old, with a large proportion falling in the 22 to 24-year range, which is significantly older than Russia’s fleet, where most vessels are under 20 years old. Since 2022, Russia has shifted its focus from European markets—where stricter regulations limit the use of older vessels—to Asian markets, particularly India, where requirements are more lenient. This has made the Russian fleet’s composition increasingly similar to that of India, which also receives substantial deliveries from Iran.
The age demographics of Russia’s oil fleet are also an issue in regions like the Baltic Sea and Danish Straits, where older Russian tankers pass through narrow, sensitive waterways en route to global markets. Environmental concerns have been raised, with calls to restrict or ban the transit of these older vessels, especially given the potential for oil spills.
However, it is important to note that non-Russian tankers carrying oil to refineries in Finland, Lithuania, Poland, and Germany are also often older. For instance, half of the non-Russian tankers in the Baltic Sea are under nine years old, while 15% are 17 years or older—similar to the age profile of Russian ships. This suggests that while the Russian fleet is slightly older on average, it is not drastically out of line with the rest of the world’s oil fleet.
In terms of overall fleet composition, there is no entirely dedicated fleet serving Russia, Iran, and Venezuela (another heavily sanctioned oil producer). Rather, the vessels transporting crude for these nations are part of the broader global fleet and often engage in business beyond just these countries. The notion of a distinct “shadow fleet” dedicated to evading sanctions is therefore somewhat exaggerated. Many of these vessels serve multiple clients and carry non-sanctioned cargoes in addition to Russian oil, which complicates efforts to enforce sanctions.
Overall, Russia’s reliance on older tankers to export oil is part of a broader strategy to mitigate the risks posed by sanctions. While the fleet may be slightly older than that of other major oil-exporting nations, it is not dramatically different in composition. Moreover, the presence of older vessels in the global fleet has not led to a marked increase in accidents or oil spills, as the industry’s safety record remains strong.
The “shadow fleet” is thus less of a distinct, secretive entity and more of a subset of the global oil shipping network, operating in both sanctioned and non-sanctioned markets. The interconnection between the Russian fleet and the global oil trade highlights the challenges in enforcing sanctions and monitoring compliance in an industry as vast and complex as international oil shipping.
