Cargo liquefaction in heavy weather

Monthly Safety Scenario by the Swedish Club

The Swedish P&I Club issues every month a Monthly Safety Scenario (MSS), a Loss Prevention initiative to assist owners. For January 2014 has issued a MSS regarding cargo liquefaction in heavy weather.

Under the ISM requirement owners are obliged to carry out monthly safety meetings or safety committee meetings onboard their vessels. This obligation stems from Chapter 5 of the ISM Code: Masters responsibility and authority and furthermore from 5.1.2, motivating the crew in the observation of that policy. The obligation can also be derived from the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seamen, where it is stated that the safety committee should meet regularly: 3.13.2, The frequency of meetings will be determined by circumstances but as a general guideline, the committee should meet about every 4-6 weeks.

It was August and the vessel was loading ironore in Indonesia, to be discharged in Vancouver.It had been raining heavily for twoweeks. The site where the vessel was loadingwas a pier on an island. The iron ore mine wasfurther inland on the island and the ore wastransported by barge and loaded onto thevessel. When loading was complete theMaster was given a loading certificate fromthe shipper which indicated that the cargohad a moisture level which was 2% belowthe TML (Transportable Moisture Limit).

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During loading a surveyor had been present forthe owners account and had done moisture testson the cargo using the can method and not ina laboratory. The shipper stated that they hadused the onsite laboratory for the moisture test.During the stay in port the vessel’s engineerscarried out some maintenance on the mainengine turbocharger. The job was completed acouple of hours before departure. The Masterreceived information that there would be heavyweather during the Pacific crossing. He did notthink it would be of any real concern for thevessel so he did not change the planned greatcircle route. This route would take the vesselabout 60 miles south of the predicted storm path.The master had sailed on the Pacific for manyyears and knew that the vessel should not have aproblem sailing this route. The manager did notuse any professional weather routing service butrelied on the Master’s experience.

After a couple of days the storm took a moresoutherly path and the vessel started to encounterstrong winds at beaufort 8, from a NE direction.The vessel reduced speed to minimize theimpact of the waves which had becomevery large.

The turbocharger for the main engine suddenlyfailed. This caused the main engine to stop andthe vessel suffered a blackout. The vessel wasnow pitching and rolling a lot because of thelarge waves. With great difficulty the engineersmanaged to dismantle the turbocharger, it wasfound that a bearing had failed and caused severedamage to the compressor and turbine-rotatingparts. It was impossible to do the required repairsbecause of the vessel’s heavy pitching and rolling.The master could not steer the vessel into thewind because of the blackout. The vessel startedto drift.

The vessel started to list to the starboard side.It was obvious that something was wrong as thevessel didn’t return to an upright position andcontinued to list more to starboard.

The Master suspected that the cargo hadshifted or in worst case liquefied. The masterdecided that the vessel was in real danger andsent out a Mayday. At about the same time thevessel started to ballast the port side to compensatefor the starboard list.

A big wave hit the vessel on the port side andthe vessel disappeared into the sea.

The Swedish P&I Club issued MSS to assist owners in their efforts of complying with the regulations. You may download the MSS (please see below) and enter the written conclusions from the meeting and then send feedback to the shore based organization.

What were the immediate causes of this accident?
Where did the chain of error start?
Is there a risk that this kind of accident could happen to our vessel?
How could this accident have been prevented?
If iron ore was shipped would we rely on the can test for testing?
Do we use weather routing?
If not would it be beneficial?
Was it necessary to have contractors to do the maintenance on the turbocharger instead?
If not when do we use external contractors?
What sections of our SMS would have been breached, if any?
Is our SMS sufficient to prevent this kind of accident?
If procedures were breached why do you think this was the case?
Do we have a risk assessment onboard that addresses these risks?
What do you think was the root cause of this accident?