BSU has issued an investigation report into an incident where a car carrier broke free from its moorings in Bremerhaven’s Verbindungshafen port on 13 March 2021.
The incident
The car carrier ENDURANCE was moored starboard side in Bremerhaven’s Verbindungshafen connecting port on 13 March 2021. At about 0945, the mooring lines parted in offshore winds with gusts of up to 50 kts (10 Bft). The master had gone to the bridge at 0924 due to the prevailing wind conditions at the berth. At 0930, he requested tug assistance via VHF and instructed two deck officers to inspect the lines. When the lines failed, he ordered the starboard anchor dropped, the main engine started, and the lowered vehicle ramp raised.
He activated the ship’s internal general alarm to initiate emergency procedures, including sounding the fuel and ballast tanks and inspecting the deck and internal spaces. The Port Authority was also notified.
Before the tugs arrived, the ENDURANCE drifted crosswind in a northeasterly direction across the Verbindungshafen toward the Lloyd Werft dockyard. The first two tugs arrived about eight minutes after the line failure, before the main engine was running. They were unable to prevent an allision with Dock III and two pontoons. At 0953, the RT INNOVATION was ready to push from the port side aft. The anchor was weighed. At 1000, the RT EMOTION made its towline fast at the bow. At 1014, the VB HUNTE began assisting amidships from the port side. A pilot arrived on board at 1015.
The ENDURANCE was initially shifted back to its original berth with the help of three tugs and a pilot. The crew took replacement ropes on deck. However, due to strong southwesterly winds, the berthing maneuver was aborted around 1034 after several attempts. With a fourth tug and an additional pilot, the vessel was shifted to the more sheltered Kaiserhafen III dock at 1130. It was made fast there at 1324, nearly four hours after the initial line failure.
The incident caused material damage to the vessel, the berth, and the dockyard. However, there were no injuries and no water pollution occurred.
Conclusions
#1 Endurance
The master was aware of the weather forecast and conscious of the potential danger of mooring line failure. In particular, he had taken appropriate precautionary measures against line failure by requesting tugs.
According to the expert’s report, the failure of the ENDURANCE’s lines was primarily due to their poor condition. According to the MEG4 recommendations, which at the time of the accident were basically only directed at tankers, 12 of the 14 mooring lines should have been replaced. Although the expert’s report does not allow any conclusions to be drawn regarding the sequence in which the lines failed or the tensile forces acting on the bollards on the pier, the BSU assumes that, in the present case, the bollard cover only sheared off at a later stage in the sequence of events.
According to the expert’s report, lines in as-new condition may not have parted. However, the winch brakes would have eventually loosened to protect the lines and the ENDURANCE would have drifted toward the dockyard with lines attached. The SMS in place at the time of the accident for line maintenance and inspection was in any case not suitable for identifying defective lines in good time. From the BSU’s perspective, tug assistance would have been necessary even with lines in as-new condition to counteract the expected lateral drift.
Port
From a legal perspective, ship’s management teams are responsible for safe mooring. Accordingly, the Bremerhaven Port Authority does not issue corresponding recommendations. The ENDURANCE’s line failure caused considerable material damage because there is almost no sea area available leeward at the berth in the Verbindungshafen connecting port when gale force winds from the west prevail. The pier opposite and Dock III of the Lloyd Werft dockyard are only about 120 m away.
There is hardly any time available to stop drifting ships with tugs. This was comparable to the accident involving the DON QUIJOTE.
At berths parallel to the River Weser, such as the berth in which the IONA’s line failed, the distance to the opposite bank is ten times as far. However, in this area vessels would be stranded in the Wadden Sea, unless tugs met them in time or they picked up speed under their own steam.
Actions taken
On the part of the ship, the mooring lines were inspected after the accident and the procurement of alternative lines was considered. Furthermore, it was already examined in 2021 whether (in principle) information on the holding power of bollards may be obtained from the ports in order to assess berth suitability in this respect.
In response to the BSU’s interim investigation report on the marine casualty involving the ENDURANCE60 and the issues relating to port authorities published therein, such as the allocation of safe berths and safe mooring, as well as proactive measures to prevent similar accidents, the harbour master took the following steps:
- port-specific weather reports from the DWD61 are used;
- berth analysis software62 was obtained to analyse the parameters of the existing berths and monitor the berths in use. The software is expected to be deployed in mid-2025;
- should an alert be triggered based on a software analysis, the Port will inspect the vessel’s mooring arrangement (including verifying that bollards only have one line placed over them);
- If the on-site inspections give rise to doubts about the mooring arrangement, then the ship’s management team should be informed of the possible deficiencies.
